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INTRODUCTION
Mass incarceration not only disenfranchises millions of Americans,
disproportionately people of color, it also increases the voting power
of predominantly white rural areas where prisons are located. People
in prison are counted towards representation while being excluded
from the franchise.
Every ten years, the Census Bureau counts the entire United States
1
population.
Each individual is counted at his or her “usual
residence,” the home where he or she lives or sleeps most of the
2
time. Legislative seats are apportioned, and electoral district lines
3
drawn, based on that Census count. For purposes of the Census, the
approximately 2.2 million people in prison in the United States are
counted as residents of the district in which they are incarcerated, not

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within
every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”); see Decennial Census of Population and
Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennialcensus.html [https://perma.cc/3STB-HZUU].
2. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE SITUATIONS
FOR THE 2010 CENSUS, at para. 2 [hereinafter RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE
SITUATIONS],
https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_
rules.html [https://perma.cc/63W7-X8T4].
3. 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a(a) (West 2017).
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4

of their home prior to incarceration. In all but two states, individuals
5
incarcerated for a felony conviction are also ineligible to vote.
Consequently, they become non-voting “residents” of the district in
which they are incarcerated, represented by a legislator over whom
they have no electoral influence.
The practice of counting people who are incarcerated and ineligible
to vote as residents of their prison cell inflates the population count in
6
districts where prisons are located. It increases the voting strength of
those districts’ other residents relative to the residents of neighboring
districts, and dilutes the voting strength of prisoners’ home
7
communities.
At the same time, correctional facilities are not
dispersed evenly throughout most states, but are often found in more
rural, predominantly white areas, while people incarcerated in these
facilities are disproportionately people of color from comparatively
8
urban areas. Counting prisoners as residents of the district where
they are incarcerated shifts political power from urban to more rural
9
areas. The confluence of prisoners’ ineligibility to vote, an increase
in the United States’ prison population in recent decades, and the
treatment of people in prison as “residents” of the district where they
are incarcerated has skewed legislative apportionment and the
distribution of political power. Counting people in prison as residents
of their home prior to incarceration will begin to address this
imbalance.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on
felony disenfranchisement, mass incarceration, and the cascading
effects of both on electoral apportionment. Part II discusses the
decennial Census, its application of the “usual residence” rule to
other people who live in “group quarters,” including military

4. See RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE SITUATIONS, supra note 2, at para. 16.
5. See ACLU ET AL., DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED: A REVIEW OF THE PREVALENCE
AND IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, at
app. B (2013) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED], http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CCPR_NGO_USA_15128_E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HK5-EDQW] (highlighting that only Maine and Vermont
residents maintain their right to vote despite a felony conviction).
6. See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the
Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2011).
7. See id. at 360.
8. See Impact on Demographic Data, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/problem/statistics.html
[https://perma.cc/
GXG5-CSNF] (“According to Department of Agriculture Demographer Calvin
Beale, although most prisoners are from urban areas, 60% of new prison construction
takes place in non-metro regions.”).
9. See Ho, supra note 6, at 364.
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personnel and college students, and how these groups are treated for
purposes of legislative apportionment. Part III then analyzes the
application of the “usual residence” rule to prisoners, and reviews
recent federal court challenges to apportionment schemes that count
people in prison as “residents” of the district in which they are
incarcerated. Part IV discusses how New York and Maryland have
successfully addressed the issue of counting people in prisons by
designating them as residents of their prior address for purposes of
legislative apportionment. Part V discusses states’ and localities’
options for improving equality in apportionment before redistricting
based on the 2020 Census.
I. MASS INCARCERATION: DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
DISTORTION OF DEMOCRACY
Mass incarceration, combined with felony disenfranchisement,
compromises the most fundamental aspect of democracy by removing
the right to vote from millions of Americans. Section I.A provides
basic statistics about the acceleration in the United States’ use of
prisons and the resulting era of mass incarceration. Section I.B
discusses the racially discriminatory roots of laws that remove
citizens’ eligibility to vote after a criminal conviction, commonly
referred to as “felony disenfranchisement,” and the electoral impact
of felony disenfranchisement in the era of mass incarceration.
A. Mass Incarceration
The United States currently convicts and incarcerates its citizens at
an historically unparalleled rate. In the United States, 85.9 million
people have a criminal record.10 Today, almost 2.2 million people are
being held in prisons or jails,11 and over 4.6 million are under some
other sort of community supervision, such as parole or probation.12
The United States’ incarceration rate increased sharply beginning in
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF
STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014, at tbl.21 (2015),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf [https://perma.cc/P35X-AKWE].
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY STATISTICS:
TOTAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL POPULATION, 1980–2015 [hereinafter KEY
STATISTICS], https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=487 [https://perma.cc/
7JTA-5KD3] (follow link next to “download data”) (data on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal).
12. See id.; see also Danielle Kaeble & Lauren Glaze, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015, BULL. NO.
NCJ 250374, Dec. 2016, at 2 tbl.1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GDX-Y96B].
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the 1980s, with the “war on drugs.”13 In 1980, approximately 500,000
people were incarcerated.14 The number of people reached over 1.1
million in 1990, and more than 1.9 million in 2000.15 By the close of
2010, 1,404,000 people were behind bars in state prisons, 748,700 in
local jails, and 209,800 in federal facilities, totaling more than 2.2
million people incarcerated.16 At the same time, the number of
people under criminal justice supervision was almost 7 million.17
Mass incarceration and its collateral consequences, such as loss of
voting rights, disproportionately affect people of color.18 There are
significant racial disparities at nearly every stage of the criminal
justice system, including, inter alia, disparities in police stops,19
arrests,20 prosecutions,21 convictions,22 imprisonment,23 and length of

13. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 60 (2011).
14. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11; see also Lauren E. Glaze & Thomas P.
Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Probation and Parole in
the United States, 2010, BULL. NO. NCJ 236019, Nov. 2011, at 3, https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ppus10.pdf [https://perma.cc/225G-DZ37] (noting that about 1.3
million people were under some form of community supervision in 1980).
15. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11. See generally Allen J. Beck & Paige M.
Harrison, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2000, BULL.
NO. NCJ 88207, Aug. 2001, at 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf
[https://perma.cc/899A-4W3X].
16. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11; see also Mass Incarceration, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/PNT3-EADW].
17. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11; see also DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED, supra
note 5, at 1.
18. See Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J.
(SUPPLEMENT) 87S, 89S–92S (2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
addressing-racial-disparities-in-incarceration [https://perma.cc/8Q72-DBNA] (noting
that in examining arrest rates, racial disparities in the arrests may reflect law
enforcement behavior in the arrest and prosecution stages, in addition to involvement
in crime).
19. See Christine Eith & Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Contacts Between Police and the Public Declined from 2002 to 2008,
BULL. NO. NCJ 234599, Oct. 2011, at 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpp08.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KV-8KZ3] (finding that black drivers were three times
more likely to be searched during a stop than white drivers.); see also Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding disproportionate
suspicionless stops or frisks of African-Americans in Fourteenth Amendment
selective law enforcement case).
20. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2013) [hereinafter SENTENCING
PROJECT UNHRC REPORT] (citing Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and
Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105,
106
(2006)),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-andJustice-Shadow-Report-ICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3T3-8SWP] (providing a
striking example: “[b]etween 1980 and 2000, the U.S. black drug arrest rate rose from
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sentence.24
These disparities lead to the disproportionate
imprisonment of people of color.25 For example, Black and Latino
offenders sentenced in state and federal courts face significantly
greater odds of incarceration than similarly situated white offenders,26
and receive longer sentences than their white counterparts.27
At the same time, prisons are often located in predominantly
white, rural areas.28 Despite studies that show better outcomes when
individuals convicted of a crime are treated in smaller communitybased programs,29 people are often incarcerated far from their
home.30
Rural areas suffering from the loss of farming or
6.5 to 29.1 per 1,000 persons; during the same period, the white drug arrest rate
increased from 3.5 to 4.6 per 1,000 persons”).
21. See id. at 9–10.
22. See id. at 1.
23. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE:
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN STATE PRISONS 4–5 (2016) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, 1978–
2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-ofJustice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HUJ7DZ3K] (noting that African Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that
is 5.1 times the imprisonment of whites).
24. See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 12–16.
25. See id. at 3, 14.
26. Id. at 2 (citing E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2011, BULL. NO. NCJ 239808, Dec. 2012, at tbl.8).
27. See generally Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest
for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2000),
http://www.justicestudies.com/pubs/livelink3-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5RQ-X27D].
28. See Ho, supra note 6, at 362–63; see also infra Sections IV.A, IV.B (discussing
with greater particularity prisons housing primarily urban and disproportionately
African American persons in rural areas).
29. See James Gilligan, Punishment Fails. Rehabilitation Works., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-beproductive/punishment-fails-rehabilitation-works
[https://perma.cc/B2HT-ENPK];
Brian Kincade, The Economics of the American Prison System, SMART ASSET
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://smartasset.com/mortgage/the-economics-of-the-americanprison-system [https://perma.cc/9SC5-RJ4K]; see also John M. Eason, The Prison
Business Is Booming in Rural America and There’s No End in Sight, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/prison-industry-boom-rural-america2017-3 [https://perma.cc/CMX9-KCYA]; Peter T. Kilborn, Rural Towns Turn to
Prisons to Reignite Their Economies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/01/us/rural-towns-turn-to-prisons-to-reignite-theireconomies.html [https://nyti.ms/2lt3Kug].
30. See, e.g., PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, IMPORTED
“CONSTITUENTS”: INCARCERATED PEOPLE AND POLITICAL CLOUT IN CONNECTICUT 5
(2013), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/ct/report_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8KSK-TWM9] (discussing the status of gerrymandering in multiple states). For more
examples, see generally Importing Constituents Series, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports.html#electoral-issues
[https://perma.cc/Y77Q3S5A] (detailing reports on Massachusetts, California, Minnesota, Wisconsin,
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manufacturing jobs have seen prisons built in their areas, based, in
part, on the promise that prisons provide local economic
development.31 Although prison companies have invested heavily in
selling the development myth,32 corrections-related jobs arguably do
not compensate local economies for the counterbalancing tax breaks
and economic incentives and, more broadly, do not account for the
financial and social costs of incarceration.33
The geographic location of prisons not only separates people
incarcerated from their families and communities, it also results in the
reallocation of political power from cities to more rural areas. A
series of Prison Policy Initiative reports illustrate this point: in
Connecticut, for example, the prison population disproportionately
comes from the five largest cities (Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven,
Stamford, and Westbury), but prisons are concentrated in just a few
areas, with sixty-five percent of the state’s prison beds located in just
five towns (Cheshire, East Lyme, Enfield, Somers, and Suffield).34 In
Massachusetts, prisons’ locations have led to electoral inequality in
the seven towns that use a “representative town meeting” form of
government, where prisoners are counted as members of the district
but cannot participate in the town meetings where decisions are
made.35 In Pennsylvania, forty percent of the people in state prisons
are from Philadelphia, while all but one percent are incarcerated
outside of the city and counted in the eight state house districts where
they are incarcerated.36 The same pattern was seen in New York and
Tennessee, New York, Nevada, and Montana); DAVID SHAPIRO, ACLU, BANKING
BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION (2011),
https://www.aclu.org/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration?re
direct=prisoners-rights/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/T8AD-SW3D].
31. See SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 18; see also Who Benefits When a Private
Prison Comes to Town?, NPR (Nov. 5, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/11/
05/142058047/who-benefits-when-a-private-prison-comes-to-town [https://perma.cc/
8F9F-7J4E].
32. See SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 38.
33. See id. at 18–31, 40.
34. See WAGNER, supra note 30, at 2.
35. See Aleks Kajstura, Prison Gerrymandering in Massachusetts: How the
Census Bureau Prison Miscount Invites Phantom Constituents to Town Meeting,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 13, 2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/ma/
towns.html [https://perma.cc/6362-6QEE].
36. In one district—District 69—ninety-two percent of the district’s African
American population cannot vote because they are incarcerated. See PETER
WAGNER & ELENA LAVARREDA, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, IMPORTING
CONSTITUENTS: PRISONERS AND POLITICAL CLOUT IN PENNSYLVANIA, at pt. II (2009),
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/pennsylvania/importing.html [https://perma.cc/
3P54-Q5RT].
ON
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Maryland, until they reformed their methods of apportionment, as
discussed in Sections IV.A and IV.B.
The United States’ overuse of incarceration and the shift of
electoral power from urban to rural areas has skewed legislative
apportionment and equitable electoral districting.
B.

Felony Disenfranchisement

Felony disenfranchisement is the loss of a citizen’s eligibility to
register and vote due to a criminal conviction.37 In all but two states,
citizens lose the right to vote upon conviction of a felony. Four states
permanently ban all persons with a felony conviction from voting.38
Twenty states ban all persons with a felony conviction from voting
until they have completed their sentence, including prison, parole,
and probation.39 Six states require completion of sentence and
impose post-sentence restrictions, such as a waiting period, before
voting rights can be restored.40 Four states prohibit those with a
felony conviction from voting while in prison or on parole.41 And
fourteen states ban voting with a felony conviction while
incarcerated.42 Only Maine and Vermont allow all eligible citizens to
vote, even if they are incarcerated.43
Felony disenfranchisement severely alters our democratic model.
The numbers are stark. If all of the citizens nationwide who are
disenfranchised due to a prior conviction populated their own state, it
would be the twentieth largest state in the country and would have
ten votes in the Electoral College.44
Without felony

37. See DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED, supra note 5.
38. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/voting-rights/criminal-re-enfranchisement/state-criminal-re-enfranchisementlaws-map [https://perma.cc/6RWQ-8YYP] (showing the four states, Florida, Iowa,
Kentucky, and Virginia, in red); see also CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3–4 (2016) [hereinafter 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS],
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-LostVoters.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJH5-VTT4].
39. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 38 (showing states in
yellow).
40. Id. (showing states in orange).
41. Id. (showing states in dark blue).
42. Id. (showing states in light blue).
43. Id. (showing states in green).
44. Chris Kirk, How Powerful Is Your Vote, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/map_of_the_week/2012/11/presidenti
al_election_a_map_showing_the_vote_power_of_all_50_states.html [https://perma.cc/
8WC5-2NFQ].
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disenfranchisement, the large number of citizens with a conviction
could affect not only local, but state and federal electoral outcomes,
were they permitted to vote.
Compared to other democratic nations, the United States is an
outlier in how it treats citizens with a conviction.45 In broad terms,
other democracies’ disenfranchisement policies range from no ban on
voting to limited, targeted bans, often only during a term of
incarceration.46
Other
nations’
courts
have
limited
disenfranchisement to circumstances where the state could
demonstrate that it was justified,47 or prohibited disenfranchisement
outright.48 In all, the United States not only leads the world in its rate
of incarcerating its citizens,49 it is also one of the strictest democracies
in terms of denying citizens the right to vote due to a conviction,
which skews democratic representation and diminishes representation
of the interests of citizens with a felony conviction.50

1.

Historical Origins of Felony Disenfranchisement

Felony disenfranchisement has a long, shameful history in the
United States. It proliferated soon after the Civil War, when white
voters sought to block Black citizens from gaining political power.51
The United States Constitution was amended to provide specific
45. See LALEH ISPAHANI, ACLU, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 4 (2006),
http://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/aclu-felon-voting-report-2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4Z5-6X3H]; Reuven Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon
Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 197, 210 (2011) (arguing that “an identifiable global trajectory has emerged
towards the expansion of felon suffrage. American jurisprudence lies outside of this
global trajectory . . . ”).
46. See ISPAHANI, supra note 45, at 6 tbl.1.
47. See Sauve v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, paras. 31–
33 (Can.) (holding that the “universal franchise has become . . . an essential part of
democracy . . . if we accept that governmental power in a democracy flows from the
citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to disenfranchise
the very citizens from whom the government’s power flows”); HCJ 2757/06 Hilla
Alrai v. Minister of the Interior 50(2) PD 18 (1996) (Isr.).
48. August v. Electoral Commission, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 23 para. 17 (S. Afr.).
49. See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
50. See ISPAHANI, supra note 45, at 33; ACLU OF FLORIDA, JOINT SUBMISSION TO
ICCPR: UNITED STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 2–3 (2012), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/
Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CCPR_NGO_USA_14528_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P94B-WW9W]; see also Ziegler, supra note 45, at 265–66.
51. Angela Behrens & Christopher Uggen, Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace
OF

of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 561 (2003).
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protections for voting in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments,52 which recognized the citizenship of all persons “born
or naturalized in the United States,” provided all persons with “equal
protection of the laws,” and prohibited the denial or abridgement of
the right to vote on account of race.53 These amendments, known as
the “Reconstruction Amendments,” superseded state laws that
explicitly prohibited African-Americans from voting. Effective
enforcement, however, was a different story.54 The Fourteenth
Amendment left open the ability to deny or abridge the right to vote
for “participation in rebellion, or other crime.”55 In the wake of these
amendments, Southern states used criminal disfranchisement and
other policies to roll back the expansion of the franchise.56
Despite the racially discriminatory effects of felony
disenfranchisement, challenges to state disenfranchisement regimes
were largely unsuccessful based on courts’ interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment provision allowing states to deny the right to
vote for “participation in . . . crime.”57 In Richardson v. Ramirez,58
the Supreme Court dealt a heavy blow to voting rights when it
decided that “the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative
sanction in [Section] 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” which
distinguished the constitutional protection against felony
disenfranchisement laws from other state limitations on the
franchise.59
52. See Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments,
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Civil
WarAmendments.htm [https://perma.cc/UQR2-R6Q9].
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, XV (alterations in original).
54. Although this Article focuses on formal legal protections for voting rights, a
prominent source of disenfranchisement during this era came from terrorist
organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan that, often sanctioned by local officials, used
violence and intimidation to prevent African American citizens from voting. For
additional historical information outside the scope of this Article, see generally ARI
BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA (2015); Introduction to Federal Voting Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws
[https://perma.cc/N895-CL8Y].
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; see Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
56. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 30; BERMAN, supra note 54, at 11.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; see Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
58. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
59. Id. at 54 (alterations in original). In Richardson, plaintiffs with felony
convictions who had completed their sentences argued that California’s
disenfranchisement law violated their Equal Protection rights. Id. The Court held,
“the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction particular to
[Section] 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. Section 2 provides: “[b]ut when the
right to vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any way abridged, except for
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It was not until the 1985 decision in Hunter v. Underwood60 that
the Supreme Court held a criminal disenfranchisement law
intentionally racially discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.
The Alabama Constitution, approved in 1901, disqualified from
voting any citizen convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude.”61
Although the provision “may at first seem racially neutral . . . the
drafters intentionally sought to subvert the [Fourteenth] and
[Fifteenth] Amendments’ protection against racial discrimination in
voting by using the moral turpitude provision, in conjunction with
discriminatory criminal justice enforcement, to target Alabama’s
Black citizens.”62 The provision provides an example of how
purportedly race-neutral criminal disfranchisement laws were tailored
to principally affect African-Americans and have had the greatest
impact on African-Americans.63 The Court in Hunter held that,
consistent with Richardson, “[Section] 2 was not designed to permit
the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and
operation of [state law] which otherwise violates [Section] 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”64

2.

Electoral Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement in an Era of Mass
Incarceration

Over six million Americans are currently disenfranchised due to a
The overall disenfranchisement rate has
felony conviction.65
increased dramatically in conjunction with the growing United States

participation in rebellion, or other crime[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2. The Court
determined that Section 1 “could not have been meant to bar outright a form of
disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from” Section 2. Richardson, 418
U.S. at 55. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, asserting that the proper test
should be whether a State could show a “compelling state interest” to justify
exclusion of ex-felons from the franchise. Id. at 77–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas dissented as well, but did not join in this portion of Justice Marshall’s
dissent. See id. at 86.
60. 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985).
61. See id. at 223.
62. See id. at 229 (explaining the state’s moral turpitude provision was meant “to
establish white supremacy”).
63. See id.
64. Id. at 233 (alterations in original) (regarding the argument that Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the disfranchisement of persons convicted of
crimes, the Court held, “we are confident that [Section] 2 was not designed to permit
the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [state
law] which otherwise violates [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in
our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez . . . suggests to the contrary.”).
65. See 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS, supra note 38, at 3.
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prison population.66 The number of citizens disenfranchised has more
than quadrupled in the past few decades—from approximately 1.17
million in 1976 to 3.34 million by 1996, and to 6.1 million by 2016—
with the unprecedented growth in the sheer number of Americans
incarcerated or kept under criminal justice supervision.67
Felony
disenfranchisement
laws
have
continued
to
disproportionately impact people of color. At present, for example,
7.7% of the African-American voting-age population, or one out of
every thirteen Black adults is disenfranchised due to a conviction.68
This rate is four times greater than the rest of the voting-age
population, which has a disenfranchisement rate of 1.8%.69
Nationwide, 2.2 million African-Americans are disenfranchised on
the basis of a conviction, more than 40% of whom have completed the
terms of their sentences.70 Felony disenfranchisement also has a
pronounced impact in individual states, particularly those with large
prison populations, disenfranchisement that extends beyond an
incarcerative sentence, and exceedingly restrictive voting rights
restoration processes.71
The assault on voting rights is threefold. First, state felony
disenfranchisement laws remove a citizen’s eligibility to vote,72 which
prevents democratic participation.
Second, mass incarceration
removes people, and disproportionately people of color, from their
home communities and holds them in prisons. Third, redistricting
and prison gerrymandering then dilutes the electoral power of those
same citizens’ home communities, and hands their electoral power to
the residents of the district in which they are incarcerated.73
Policy choices about where and how individuals are incarcerated
matter for voting rights. Incarcerating people far away from their

66. See supra Section I.A.
67. See 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS, supra note 38, at 3; see also Hadar Aviram et
al., Felon Disenfranchisement, 13 ANN. REV. SOC. SCI. 295, 300 (2017).
68. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL
ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1–2
(2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_State_Level_
Estimates_of_Felon_Disen_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5MZ-RERY].
69. Id.
70. Id. at 17.
71. This includes, most prominently, the three states with permanent
disenfranchisement (Florida, Iowa, and Kentucky). See Criminal Disenfranchisement
Laws Across the United States, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.brennancenter.org/criminal-disenfranchisement-laws-across-united-states
[https://perma.cc/Q48A-NXUL].
72. See DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED, supra note 5; see also supra Section I.B.
73. See Ho, supra note 6, at 364; see also supra Section I.B.2.
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homes effectively removes residents—disproportionately people of
color—from urban areas and credits their voting strength to more
rural areas, thus altering the composition of electoral districts and
according more power to the votes in districts with prisons and
prisoners who cannot vote.74 This gives the votes of voters in a
district containing a prison more weight because the total population
(including non-voting prisoners) has grown, even though the voting
population has not changed.75 At the same time, it deflates the
weight of votes in areas targeted for criminal justice enforcement,
which tend to include urban areas, exacerbating the cycle of
democratic exclusion.76
By relocating a concentration of
disenfranchised citizens from primarily urban areas to rural areas
where they do not have a representative accountable to their
interests, the combination of felony disenfranchisement and prison
districting severely disrupts representational democracy.77
II. REDISTRICTING AND COUNTING PRISONERS
Section II.A provides background on the explicit constitutional
requirements related to counting the population, apportionment, and
redistricting. Section II.B explains the “usual residence” rule,
established by the Census Act of 1790. Section II.C explains how the
“usual residence” rule has been applied to other inhabitants of
“group quarters,” specifically overseas federal employees, residents of
domestic military bases, and college students. This Article argues
that courts’ treatment of these groups demonstrates that careful
review and consideration of groups’ insularity or community ties
should factor into the determination of whether they should be
considered residents for purposes of apportionment. This Article
concludes that the same consideration should be made for prisoners,
which will often result in their exclusion from the population base of
the place that they are incarcerated.

74. See Ho, supra note 6, at 370–71.
75. If three voters and a prison population of seven constitute one district, and ten
voters constitute a neighboring district, the three voters’ votes have more weight than
the ten neighboring voters: the three voters’ representative has equal authority as the
representative from the neighboring district, who represents ten voters.
76. See Ho, supra note 6, at 370–71, 390.
77. See infra Part III.
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A. Constitutional Requirements
The decennial Census is a full count of the nation’s population.78 It
is constitutionally required: an “actual enumeration” of persons in
each state must be conducted every ten years, in the manner
prescribed by federal law,79 and the apportionment of congressional
representatives must be determined every ten years on the basis of
that count.80
For purposes of redistricting, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Equal Protection clause to require jurisdictions to abide by the
one-person, one-vote principle.81 That principle requires states to
draw congressional districts with populations that are as close to
equal as possible,82 but may also accommodate traditional districting
principles, such as compactness, maintaining communities of interest,
observing political subdivisions, and considering incumbents,
particularly in state and local districting plans, which are given more
leeway.83
78. See Decennial Census of Population and Housing, supra note 1.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within
every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”).
80. Id. (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several
States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .”); see 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a(a) (West
2017).
81. See Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 760–63 (2012) (holding
that states must justify population deviations among districts with “legitimate state
objectives”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (requiring that states
apportion seats in the state legislature on the basis of the population); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Congressional districts must be drawn
with equal populations); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (establishing the
“one person, one vote” theory); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1962) (holding
that malapportionment claims are justiciable). See generally Evenwel v. Abbott,
136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123–24 (2016).
82. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 734 (1983) (establishing that for
congressional reapportionment “there are no de minimis population
variations . . . which could practicably be avoided”). Any deviation, “no matter how
small,” must be justified by a legitimate state interest. Id. at 730. State and local
redistricting plans are given slightly more leeway.
83. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969). Districting plans
must satisfy both the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement and
requirements that ensure that they satisfactorily maintain actual communities of
interest, for example, balancing the number of schools across districts in a school
board districting plan; that they are contiguous (all parts of a district are connected at
some point with the rest of the district); that they do not unnecessarily pit incumbents
against one another in a combined district; and that they are reasonably compact
according to a visual inspection of district lines. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977–
78 (1996). Another measure used to examine a districting plan is the Reock scores
for each of the districts. See Daniel McGlone, Measuring District Compactness in
PostGIS, AZAVEA (July 11, 2016), https://www.azavea.com/blog/2016/07/11/
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For state and local district drawing, the Supreme Court established
a “safe-harbor” rule: if the maximum deviation between the most and
least populated districts is less than ten percent, the plan is
presumptively compliant with one-person, one-vote.84 Deviations of
more than ten percent are not strictly prohibited, but they are
presumptively impermissible and shift the burden to the defendant
jurisdiction to prove that legitimate interests justify the deviation.85
And deviations of less than ten percent are not necessarily
constitutional if the deviations do not serve a legitimate state
purpose.86
The Court has not, however, decided many cases regarding which
population base jurisdictions must equalize in redistricting and who
should be counted in the population base.87 While congressional
jurisdictions use the total population, determined by the decennial
Census, as the base population for apportionment,88 some
circumstances warrant the use of a more narrowly defined
population.89 Although the Court has not identified which factual
circumstances warrant using a base other than total population, it has
recognized that “[e]qual representation for equal numbers of people
is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and
diminution of access to elected representatives.”90

measuring-district-compactness-postgis/ [https://perma.cc/H7FX-PYXU].
Reock
scores are generated from the Reock test, which is an area-based measure that
compares each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape
possible. Id. For each district, the Reock test computes the ratio of the area of the
district to the area of the minimum enclosing circle for the district. Id. The measure
is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact. Id. The Reock test
computes one number for each district and the minimum, maximum, mean and
standard deviation for the plan. Id.
84. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531.
85. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (approving a state-legislative map
with a deviation of 16%). The Court has not set a numerical level above which the
population disparity is per se intolerable, but cautioned that the 16% deviation “may
well approach tolerable limits.” Id. at 329.
86. Tennant, 567 U.S. at 760–63 (holding that states must justify population
deviations among districts with “legitimate state objectives”).
87. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 90–97 (1966) (holding that Hawaii
could use the registered voter population because of the particular factual
circumstances of having a substantial resident military population who were residents
of other states for the purposes of voting and were registered to vote elsewhere).
90. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531
(1969)).
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The “Usual Residence” Rule

The “usual residence” rule enables the Census Bureau to
determine where people live for purposes of counting the
population.91 The First Congress interpreted the Constitution as
requiring that persons be counted at their “usual residence.”92 The
Census Act of 1790, also referred to as the Enumeration Act, was
passed to effectuate that mandate. The Enumeration Act provided
that “every person occasionally absent at the time of the enumeration
[shall be counted] as belonging to that place in which he usually
resides in the United States.”93 It is notable that the Enumeration
Act placed no limit on the duration of a resident’s absence, which,
“considering the modes of transportation available at the time, may
have been quite lengthy.”94
The term “usual residence” “can mean more than mere physical
presence, and has been used broadly enough to include some element
of allegiance or enduring tie to a place.”95 How, then, should
jurisdictions determine “usual residence,” defined as “the place where
a person lives and sleeps most of the time,” for the purposes of
identifying the constitutionally appropriate population base to
apportion legislative districts?
When Congress passed the Enumeration Act, the population count
was used only to determine a state’s population to allocate
congressional representation, and the prison population was
comparatively small.96 But with the unprecedented growth in
incarceration in recent decades, and the reliance on Census data for
state and local legislative redistricting, the inclusion of prison cells in
our definition of “usual residence” fails to account for prisoners’
experience of incarceration far from home, to which they are likely to
return. The notion that a prison cell qualifies as a residence is
outdated and ripe for reconsideration.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Census Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 101, 103 (alterations in original).

See generally id.
See id.

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 804 (1992).

Id.
See Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass
Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2012) [hereinafter Wagner,
Breaking the Census].
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How Is the Usual Residence Rule Applied to Other GroupQuartered Persons for Purposes of Apportionment?

The “usual residence” definition presents a challenge for counting
categories of persons, including prisoners, who live in “group
quarters.” The Census defines group quarters as “a place where
people live or stay, in a group living arrangement, that is owned or
managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or
services for the residents.”97
This definition includes federal
personnel stationed abroad or on military bases, college students, and
those staying in hospitals.98 Because there is limited case law specific
to the treatment of prisoners’ residence for the purpose of
apportioning state and local legislative districts, this section will
describe other “group quarters” contexts to provide insight into the
factors courts have used to determine a person’s usual residence when
they are not in a typical household living arrangement.
This Article argues that prisons are different from the other “group
quarters” in a variety of ways. First, prisoners are not in prison by
choice.99 Second, due to the severe and purposeful isolation of
prisons, prisoners lack economic, social, or civic ties to the
communities just beyond the prison walls.100 Third, due to disparities
in the criminal justice system and political dimensions to prison
97. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY/PUERTO RICO
COMMUNITY
SURVEY,
GROUP
QUARTERS
DEFINITIONS
1
(2010),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/group_definitions/2010GQ_
Definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF3V-T3FD].
98. Id. The Census Bureau’s definition of a group quarters is:
[A] place where people live or stay, in a group living arrangement, that is
owned or managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or
services for the residents. This is not a typical household-type living
arrangement. These services may include custodial or medical care as well
as other types of assistance, and residency is commonly restricted to those
receiving these services. People living in group quarters are usually not
related to each other. Group quarters include such places as college
residence halls, residential treatment centers, skilled nursing facilities, group
homes, military barracks, correctional facilities, and workers’ dormitories.

Id.

99. See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 1. While
individuals who are incarcerated made a choice to violate state or federal laws, law
enforcement policies and practices, in many ways, determine who among those who
break the law are prosecuted or convicted. See supra Section I.A. Once an individual
has been convicted and incarcerated, they may be transferred at will among state
prisons or between federal prisons without choice or consent.
100. See Ho, supra note 6, at 374–75. There are some criminal justice programs
that allow or encourage contact and continued engagement with the community. See
discussion supra note 29 (discussing individuals convicted of a crime being treated in
smaller community-based programs and facilities close to their homes).
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locations, the demographic incongruity between the prison
population and the surrounding community is stark.101 All three
factors should caution against counting prisoners as residents of their
cells for purposes of redistricting.

1.

Allocation of Overseas Federal Employees

Just after the 1990 Census, the Supreme Court decided Franklin v.
Massachusetts.102 In Franklin, the state of Massachusetts and two

individual voters sued the Department of Commerce, which houses
the Census Bureau, claiming it had erred in deciding to include
overseas federal employees103 in the state population count.104 Due
to the Census designation of 922,819 overseas federal employees as
residents of the state designated as their “home of record” in their
personnel file, Massachusetts lost a seat in the House of
Representatives after the 1990 decennial Census.105 Plaintiffs sought
to have the Secretary of Commerce eliminate overseas federal
employees entirely from the apportionment count and recalculate the
number of Representatives per state.106 The Department of Defense,
however, argued that “its employees should not be excluded from
101. See id. at 361 (“In 173 counties nationwide, more than 50% of the purported
African-American ‘residents’ are behind bars. In New York, 98% of prison cells are
located in disproportionately white State Senate districts.”).
102. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
103. See Will 2010 Census Apportionment Population Counts Also Include Any
Americans Overseas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://ask.census.gov/prweb/
PRServletCustom/YACFBFye-rFIz_FoGtyvDRUGg1Uzu5Mn*/!STANDARD?py
Activity=pyMobileSnapStart&ArticleID=KCP-2692 [https://perma.cc/M9P6-W5U2]
(“Federal employees (military and civilian) and their dependents living overseas with
them that can be assigned to a home state. These data are provided to the Census
Bureau by the employing Federal departments and agencies through their
administrative records. Private U.S. citizens living abroad who are not affiliated with
the Federal government (either as employees or their dependents) will not be
included in the overseas counts. These overseas counts are used solely for
reapportioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.”).
104. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802. The Census Bureau did not allocate overseas
federal employees to particular states for reapportionment until 1970. See id. at 792–
93. In 1970, the Bureau allocated members of the Armed Forces to their “home of
record” using their Defense Department personnel records, which requires service
members to declare their “home of record” upon entry into the military. See id. at
793. In 1980, the Bureau did not allocate overseas federal employees to a particular
state. See id. In 1990, the Census Bureau decided to allocate the Department of
Defense’s overseas employees to their “home of record” again, declining to use a
survey to determine their last six months of residency in the United States, their legal
residence, or their last duty station due to practical constraints and the similarities
between “usual residence” and “home of record” definition. See id. at 794.
105. Id. at 790–91.
106. See id. at 791.
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apportionment counts because of the temporary and involuntary
residence oversees.”107 Ultimately, the Department of Defense’s
argument prevailed.108
The Supreme Court in Franklin found the interpretations of the
Constitution by the First Congress to be persuasive in the context of
congressional redistricting.109 The Court determined that using
“home of record” data to count federal employees serving overseas
complied with Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution’s command to
allocate congressional representatives by counting persons “in” each
state through an “actual Enumeration” of “their respective
Number.”110 The Court declined to disturb the Secretary of
Commerce’s judgment that “federal employees temporarily stationed
overseas had retained their ties to the States,” a determination made
with reference to the individuals’ subjective intent.111 It held that the
Secretary’s determination that “[m]any, if not most, of these military
overseas consider themselves to be usual residents of the United
States, even though they are temporarily assigned overseas,” is
“consonant with, though not dictated by, the text and history of the
Constitution.”112 The Court noted that the determination “does not
hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation,
but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have
indeed retained their ties to their home States, actually promotes
equality.”113
A number of the Court’s observations in this case are relevant to
the question of how to count prisoners. First, the term “usual
residence” in the “first enumeration Act” is related to the
constitutional phrase “in each state” and pertains to dividing
congressional representation among states.114 In the context of
Franklin, this simply implies that each individual must be counted
somewhere. Left with a choice between assigning overseas military
personnel to the state they have designated as their “home of record”
or not counting them at all, the Census Bureau understandably made
the choice, approved by the Court, to include individuals stationed

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 793 (emphasis added).
Id. at 806.
See id. at 804.
See id. at 806.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 804.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

342

[Vol. XLV

overseas.115 In the context of state and local apportionment, the
question is where to count prisoners, not whether to count them.
Second, the Court recognized that the “in each state” language is
more relevant when it comes to apportioning power among states (for
congressional seats) than within a state.116 The Court gave the
examples of students, members of Congress (who may choose
whether to be counted in the Washington, D.C. area or in their home
states), and “[t]hose persons who are institutionalized in out-of-state
hospitals or jails for short terms,”117 to demonstrate that “usual
residence” is more broadly understood than mere physical presence
on the day of the Census.
Third, the Court determined that the Secretary of Commerce could
reasonably rest on the assumption that employees abroad maintained
ties to their home state when he interpreted “usual residence” to have
“some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a place” beyond just
physical presence.118 The judgment to include these groups in a state
population count, even if they are temporarily out of state, “does not
hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation,”
but “actually promotes equality” assuming “that employees
temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their
home states.”119 Were the same reasoning applied in the context of
prisons, it is significant that incarcerated people are significantly less
likely to develop ties to a community in which they are involuntarily
isolated in a prison cell, but remain tied to the community from which
they came.

2.

Residence of Domestic Military Bases

With regard to military personnel and redistricting, the Supreme
Court has held that jurisdictions can, in some circumstances, properly
exclude military personnel from the apportionment base of the
district in which they are stationed. In the 1966 decision Burns v.
Richardson,120 the Court reviewed the Hawaii legislature’s interim

115. See id. at 806 (noting that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that “eliminating
overseas employees entirely from state counts will make representation in Congress
more equal”).
116. Id. at 805.
117. Id. at 805–06 (alterations in original).
118. Id. at 804 (“The term can mean more than mere physical presence, and has
been used broadly enough to include some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a
place.”).
119. Id. at 806.
120. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
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state senate apportionment scheme.121 The challenged redistricting
plan used registered voters as the population base rather than total
population—that is, it attempted to roughly equalize the number of
registered voters per district across the legislative districts.122 Due to
the presence of a large number of military personnel stationed in
Hawaii but not registered to vote there, the use of a registered voter
base led to “sizable differences in results [compared to those]
produced by the distribution according to the State’s total population,
as measured by the federal census figures.”123
The Court approved Hawaii’s use of the registered-voter
apportionment base as compliant with one-person, one-vote
requirements,124 despite acknowledging that using registered voters to
apportion state legislative seats might result in distributions of seats
that are “substantially different” from what would have resulted from
using a total population base.125 It held that states were not required
to include non-voting categories in the apportionment base, such as,
“aliens, transients, short term or temporary residents, or persons
denied the vote for conviction of crime . . . .”126 The Court noted that
“[t]he decision to include or exclude any such group involves choices
about the nature of representation with which we have been shown
no constitutionally founded reason to interfere.”127
Other federal courts in Hawaii have also adjudicated claims with
consideration for what the Burns court had termed “Hawaii’s special
population problem”—a state of islands with a substantial temporary
military population.128 Following the 2010 Census, in Kostick v.
Nago,129 individual plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
Hawaii’s state legislative reapportionment plan, which had removed
108,767 active-duty military personnel, military dependents, and nonresident university students from the apportionment base for
purposes of state legislative redistricting.130 The district court denied

121. See id. at 73.
122. See id. at 86.
123. Id. at 90 (alterations in original).
124. See id. at 97.
125. See id. at 93.
126. Id. at 92 (alterations in original).
127. Id. (alterations in original).
128. Id. at 94.
129. 878 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Haw. 2012).
130. See id. at 1127–28. Ten years before Kostick, in 1992, Hawaii had amended its
constitution to require that reapportionment of state legislative districts were based
on permanent residents, instead of the Census count of “usual residents.” See id. at
1127; see also HAW. CONST. art. IV § 4. The state used “usual residence” to draw its
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the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and approved the
state’s “finely tuned” work to extract permanent residents from the
group not counted towards the total population (i.e., Hawaii did not
exclude “the entire ‘military population’ but only non-resident
military personnel and dependents, as well as non-resident students”)
for purposes of districting.131 Recognizing the presence of a large
non-resident military population, comprising about fourteen percent
of the population, the district court approved of this fact-specific,
non-discriminatory formulation of how to distribute political power in
light of a large non-voting population.132
The Kostick court noted that the difficulty of counting non-voting,
non-permanent residents was unavoidable.133 If non-resident military
personnel are counted in the population base, but vote elsewhere,
residents in counties containing a military base have greater “voting
power” than residents of other counties; but if non-resident military
personnel are excluded, that county’s other residents may have their
representation diluted.134
The court also recognized the “political dimension” of districting
decisions when it comes to combining two different politically insular
groups or subsuming one group in another.135 Specifically, the
“unique political and socio-economic identities” between islands

federal congressional districts, but “permanent residents” as the relevant population
to draw state legislative districts. See Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1129–30. All three
groups—active-duty military personnel, military dependents, and non-resident
university students—would have been counted in the 2010 census and used for
federal districts, but were not used for state districts. See id. at 1129. Of course, any
state plan must comply with the one-person one-vote requirements of the Equal
Protection clause. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
131. Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1142. This distinction is important for Equal
Protection purposes. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965), the Court struck
down Texas’s blanket rule denying all members of the armed services the franchise
even when some of those service-men and women would have qualified as residents.
The Burns Court distinguished Hawaii’s redistricting plan from Texas’s
disenfranchising law in Carrington, finding it to be categorization based on
(presumably reasonable) residency requirements, as opposed to one that is arbitrary.
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 n.21 (1966) (“The difference between exclusion
of all military and military-related personnel, and exclusion of those not meeting a
State’s residence requirements is a difference between an arbitrary and a
constitutionally permissible classification.”).
132. See Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. A Hawaii district court had already
rejected the use of a base population that excluded the entire military population,
without attempting individual assignment, as a violation of the one-person, one-vote
principle. See Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554, 571 (D. Haw. 1982).
133. See Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
134. Id. at 1131–32.
135. Id. at 1132.
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favored a rule that avoids bi-county districts where a legislator would
represent very different communities on different islands.136
Populations “have developed their own and, in some instances
severable communities of interests” resulting in “an almost
personalized identification” with one’s island as a community of
interest.137 The court noted that residents of different islands “take
great interest in the problems of their own county because of that
very insularity brought about by the surrounding and separating
ocean.”138 The courts may have come to a different result for the
treatment of domestically stationed military personnel, were there
less political or economic insularity among communities.139
The lesson of Kostick, then, is that perhaps courts should not seek
to create a one-size-fits-all formula for defining whether particular
groups of non-voters must be included in a population base, but
instead consider the political dimensions of dilution to support the
principle of equitable electoral power and access to elected
representatives. Blind reliance on unadjusted Census data, or overly
blunt cuts defining which population to include or exclude, can lead
to problematic results.

3.

Residence of College Students

College students present a similar quandary. Until the 1950s,
“college students were counted as belonging to the State where their
parents resided, not to the State where they attended school.”140
One-person, one-vote case law regarding college students has since
developed, in local and statewide redistricting contexts, with
consideration for students’ relative insularity or community ties with
other residents of their college town.

136. Id. at 1133.
137. Id. at 1132 (quoting Burns v. Gill, 316 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (D. Haw. 1970)).
138. Burns, 316 F. Supp. at 1291.
139. Courts have come to a different result for the treatment of domestically
stationed military personnel in other factual circumstances. In a Virginia example,
the Court considered a districting plan that relied on census data to count some
36,000 military personnel in the state senate district where they were “homeported”—that is, the district containing their naval base—even though only half of
those people actually resided in the district for purposes of voting. Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315, 331–32 (1973). The Court held that the scheme was unconstitutional
because it “resulted in . . . significant population disparities.” Id. Significantly, the
state could not simply fall back on its reliance on Census figures without considering
the factual implications and disparities in the effect. Id.
140. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 805–06 (1992).
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In Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans,141 for example, the Borough of
Bethel Park argued that the Census Bureau erred in counting college
students as residents of the town in which they attended school.142
The district court denied plaintiffs injunctive relief and entered
judgment in favor of defendants.143 The Third Circuit affirmed and
gave great deference to the Census Bureau’s decision to allocate
college students to their school state, reasoning that once a student
has left his parental home to pursue studies at a college in another
state, normally for several years, it can reasonably be concluded that
“his usual place of abode ceases to be that of his parents,” adding
“[s]uch students usually eat, sleep, and work in the state where their
college is located.”144 The court determined that the Census Bureau
was entitled to limit its inquiry to objective facts as to where such a
“usual place of abode” might be.145
In a similar case, Boddie v. City of Cleveland,146 residents of
Cleveland claimed that their voting rights were diluted when residents
of a Delta State University dormitory were included in the
apportionment base of the Cleveland School District.147 The district
court in Boddie denied plaintiffs summary judgment, noting that “the
distinction between resident and non-resident students must be
emphasized.”148 The court explained that the “concept of a nonresident dorm student . . . refer[s] to students who do not vote in local
elections or consider themselves residents of the local voting
district.”149 In illustrating the difference between different kinds of
students, the Boddie court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Fairley v. Patterson,150 upholding a redistricting plan in which a town
excluded from the apportionment population students who were
unmarried, lived on the campus in dormitories or fraternity houses,
and were shown in their college registration cards to have an address

141. 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971).
142. See id. at 577.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 581 (alterations in original).
145. See id. at 579.
146. (Boddie II ), No. 4:07 CV 63-M-B, 2010 WL 231749 (N.D. Miss. 2010).
147. See id. at *1. In Boddie v. City of Cleveland (Boddie I ), 297 F. Supp. 2d 901,
905–06 (N.D. Miss. 2004), the district court held that the nonresident student
population residing in dormitories at the university should not be included in the
apportionment base for the city’s aldermanic wards.
148. Boddie II, 2010 WL 231749, at *3.
149. See id. (alterations in original).
150. See id. at *4–5 (citing Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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outside the county.151 Fairley upheld the districting plan in part
because the town had made careful fine-grained distinctions between
different kinds of students.152 For example, it excluded unmarried,
non-resident, dorm-living students who lived on campus but included
non-resident students residing off campus.153
As with courts’ treatment of military personnel, the college student
apportionment cases demonstrate how a careful factual review of the
community’s insularity or community ties can be relevant to
identifying non-residents. Courts approved an apportionment base in
which the locality had considered students’ ties to the college
community versus their ties to their last address, albeit by antiquated
indicators such as their marital status in Fairley, or the length of time
that had passed since leaving a parent’s home in Stans. These factdriven determinations necessitate an inquiry into the strength of
students’ ties to their previous home versus their college home, which
is also a useful analysis to perform in the prison context.
III. VOTE DILUTION AND PRISON GERRYMANDERING: RECENT
ACLU LITIGATION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN PRISON
GERRYMANDERING
Beginning with the 2010 Census, the Census Bureau enabled, but
did not perform, population adjustments for prisoners.154 The Bureau
released the population data of “group quarters,” which includes
prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, college dormitories, military
barracks, group homes and shelters,155 early “to enable States to
‘leave the prisoners counted where the prisons are, delete them from
redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other locale.’”156 For
pragmatic and administrative reasons, the Census Bureau did not
151. See Fairley, 493 F.2d at 602–03. Plaintiffs challenged the districting plan as
unconstitutional under the one-person, one-vote standard. Plaintiffs also challenged
the districting method under traditional equal protection standards alleging that the
excluded students were unreasonably classified as non-residents while others were
included, and on Twenty-Sixth Amendment grounds. See id.
152. See id. at 602.
153. See id. (decision after review of the facts at trial).
154. See Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895–96 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 567
U.S. 930 (2012).
155. See Group Quarters/Residence Rules, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/group-quarters.html
[https://perma.cc/PYB9-MHRG].
156. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896 (quoting Robert Groves, So, How Do You
Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: DIRECTOR’S BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2010/03/so-how-do-you-handleprisons.html [https://perma.cc/2H93-Y79X]).
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itself make those population adjustments,157 but the available data
enables and supports adjusting the base population for a more
equitable redistricting process.
Taking into account the disenfranchisement of people with a prior
conviction, the usual residence rule, how the geography of mass
incarceration has skewed electoral district lines, and the fact that
States now have the data and capacity to make population
adjustments before redistricting, should jurisdictions change how they
determine the residency of incarcerated persons? States, in the first
instance, should seek to equalize the weight of votes to prioritize
representational equality, as explained below.158 Voting rights
advocates, in a series of cases, have argued that representational
equality is not appropriately served when prisoners are treated as
residents of the district in which they are incarcerated.159
This section addresses questions as to how localities can use Census
data to allocate prison populations to serve the principles of equity of
representation. Sections III.A through III.C review two significant
redistricting challenges to apportionment schemes where large prison
populations were counted as residing at their place of incarceration.
Section III.A discusses Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of
Commissioners,160 a challenge to the apportionment of prisoners in
county commission districts. Section III.B introduces Evenwel v.
Abbott,161 a recent Supreme Court decision reviewing the
appropriate base for state legislative redistricting (unrelated to
counting prisoners). Section III.C discusses Davidson v. City of
Cranston,162 a challenge to the apportionment of prisoners in local
city ward districts. Section III.D assesses the impact of the viability of
the two prison districting decisions in light of the decision in Evenwel.

157. Id. at 895 (quoting U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABULATING PRISONERS AT THEIR
“PERMANENT
HOME
OF
RECORD”
ADDRESS
10
(2006),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/u.s.%20census%20report%20on
%20addresses%20of%20prisoners%2C%202006.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QV3-VZNG])
(“The Bureau has explained that counting prisoners at their home addresses would
require ‘collecting information from each prisoner individually’ and necessitate ‘an
extensive coordination procedure’ with correctional facilities.”); id. at 896 (“Such an
effort would likely cost up to $250 million.”).
158. See Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1303 (N.D.
Fla. 2016).
159. See infra Sections III.A–C.
160. 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292.
161. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
162. 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).

2018] GEOGRAPHY OF MASS INCARCERATION

349

A. Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners:
Understanding the Equal Protection Clause to Protect
Representational Equality, as well as Electoral Equality
A groundbreaking prison districting challenge, litigated by the
ACLU of Florida, is Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of
Commissioners,163 in which the federal district court suggested a
workable standard for determining when prison gerrymandering
violates the one-person, one-vote requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.164
In Calvin, plaintiffs challenged a Florida county commission
districting scheme where non-voting prisoners constituted around
forty-two percent of the population of one single member district.165
Jefferson County, in the Florida panhandle, has a population of
14,761, as determined by the 2010 Census.166 The county elects five
county board commissioners in single-member districts.167 The
county contains Jefferson Correctional Institution (“JCI”), a state
prison run by the Florida Department of Corrections, which
incarcerates 1157 people.168 Nine of those prisoners were convicted
in Jefferson County, and the rest were convicted in other parts of the
state.169
Plaintiffs were residents of the four single-member districts in
Jefferson that did not contain JCI, and claimed that their votes were
diluted by the inclusion of the prison population in the base
apportionment population for District 3, the district in which JCI is
located.170 The district court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor and held
that the county commission districting scheme violated the oneperson, one-vote standard.171
The court determined that the
apportionment scheme served neither representational nor electoral
equality.172 The scheme did not promote electoral equality because

163. See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1292.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 1298.
166. See id. at 1297.
167. See id. at 1295.
168. See id. at 1296.
169. See id.; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary
Judgment, Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS,
2015 WL 12777334, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Sep. 18, 2015) (“The overwhelming majority of
JCI prison inmates are not residents of Jefferson County, much less District 3.”).
170. See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1298.
171. See id. at 1326.
172. See id.
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voters in District 5 had more weight to their votes than voters in the
other districts.173 It also did not serve representational equality
because the District 5 commissioner could not fairly be said to
represent JCI prisoners who lacked any “representational nexus” to
the elected commissioner in their district.174
The Calvin court described a “representational nexus” as a
significant component of the relationship between constituent and
representative.175 A representational nexus does not simply rely on a
person’s physical location within a representative’s district, but looks
instead at “the ability of the representative to meaningfully affect that
person’s life[.]”176 As described by the court, representatives serve
multiple functions: as a participant in decision making on behalf of
her district, as an advocate connecting those within her district to
government, and as a provider of government services.177 The Calvin
court explained that the personal interest in representational equality,
or the “right to be represented,”178 was only served if those counted
as constituents of a district had some representational nexus to the
representative elected from that district.179
To address the importance of a representational nexus as the focal
point of the judicial inquiry, the court posed two questions: “[f]irst,
what does a representative do for those he represents?”180 The court
outlined three duties of a representative to his or her constituents:
(1) she translates her constituents’ interests, explicitly or by her
determination of what is most beneficial, when she helps make or
influence policy decisions, including voting for or against laws; (2) she
is an ombudsman and guide for her constituents to access the complex
channels of government; and (3) she articulates the interests of her
constituents, often publicly and on official records, even when she is

173. See id. at 1323–24.
174. Id. at 1311 (“This case [is] . . . one in which a group of people lives full-time
within a geographical boundaries of a district and yet has little, if any,
representational nexus with the representative from that district or the legislative
body to which he belongs.”).
175. See id. at 1310–11.
176. Id. at 1310 (alterations in original).
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1307. The court recognized that whether it is a cognizable legal right
is an open question, but noted that it is difficult to see why a non-voter in a district
with an excess of people would have standing to bring an Equal Protection claim
alleging “dilution of her representational strength,” without a comparable right to
bring a claim for “dilution of her vote.” See id. at 1307 n.12.
179. See id. at 1310–11.
180. Id. at 1307.
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unable to influence policy decisions, providing an “expressive element
separate and apart from any policy-related utilitarian benefit.”181
Second, the court asked “in what ways (besides voting) can
someone affect the performance of the representative’s functions?”—
or what services do representatives provide their constituents?182 The
Calvin court explained that constituents have the right to interact
with their elected officials in a number of ways, such as through
written communications, fundraising, protests, and at official
events.183 Consequently, constituents can be sure their representative
has “‘an intimate sympathy with’ those she represents.”184
Apportionment directly affects whether a citizen’s efforts to engage
their public officials are likely to be effective: an increase in the
number of people in a district means each person will get “a lower
level of services per denizen,”185 as representatives with larger
constituencies will find themselves pulled in an increasing number of
directions.186 Because a large population without any nexus to its
designated representative loses the opportunity for representation,
counting that population within the representative’s district does not
serve the principle of representational equality behind equalizing
districts’ populations.187
Next, to determine whether the apportionment scheme serves
representational equality, the court asked whether there is “a large
number of nonvoters whose representational nexus with the
legislative body is substantially different—different in kind, not just
degree—from the typical person present in the legislative body’s
jurisdiction.”188 This begs the question of whether a category of
residents, here prisoners, has a very different relationship with the
representative—unable to vote for, engage with, or seek effective
assistance from him or her—than other residents. Or, as the court
explained, “whether the population at issue is similarly situated in any
relevant way to the typical denizens and/or voters of the jurisdiction
with respect to the legislative body.”189

181. Id. at 1307–08.
182. Id. at 1307.
183. See id. at 1308–09.
184. Id. at 1309.
185. Id. (characterizing Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 781 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in relevant part)).
186. See id. at 1309 (citations omitted).
187. See id. at 1321.
188. Id. at 1315 n.20.
189. Id.
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Based on this line of inquiry, the court found that prisoners indeed
lack a representational nexus to their elected representatives.190 It
reasoned that all aspects of prison life are controlled by prison
officials and state level administrators.191 While prisoners are not
completely divorced from the outside world—they have access to
medical care and fire-fighting and trash collection services—the
isolation and control by state-level entities, particularly the state
Department of Corrections, renders the commissioners relatively
impotent to regulate inmates’ lives.192 Additionally, county social and
economic policy decisions do not meaningfully affect inmates.193 This
observation should be unsurprising: it is consistent with the purpose
of incarceration, which is to isolate incarcerated persons from
society.194 Prisoners’ isolation from the surrounding community
prevents nearly all political engagement with their representatives.
With regard to equalizing total population, the court held that an
equal population did not always adequately serve representational
equality.195
The court explained, “disparities in total census
population . . . are not in and of themselves unconstitutional.”196 The
safe harbor rule in one-person, one-vote cases is a rebuttable
presumption that a deviation of less than ten percent of total
population is permissible for state and local districts.197 The safe
harbor rule is an evidentiary rule of burden-shifting and not a
substantive constitutional construction.198 The safe harbor rule
cannot possibly cover every circumstance, since population deviations
must serve a legitimate state interest.199 The court in Calvin found
that the rule could not be mechanically applied in Jefferson County—
with a relatively small district and a comparatively large block of nonvoters—because it was “not designed to be used in a factual situation

190. See id. at 1316.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1316–18.
193. See id. at 1317.
194. See id. at 1319.
195. See id. at 1314–15; see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983). For
proponents of electoral equality, equalizing total population is also not an end in
itself, but instead the means of achieving electoral equality. Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at
1311 (citing Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting in relevant part)).
196. Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1311.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 1314.
199. See generally Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758 (2012).
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such as this one.”200 Applying the fact-intensive representational
nexus test will avoid this pitfall.
Overall, the court sets forth a three-part methodology to determine
whether the population base used for districting violates one-person
one-vote principles: (1) start with the Census total population;201 (2)
identify what group is excluded and determine “if it is not similarly
situated to the remainder of the population either with respect to
citizenship (that is, ability to vote), residency, or denizenship . . . the
fit has to be fairly good—better than would be required for rational
basis review”;202 and (3) even if no group is sought to be excluded, a
review of the factual circumstances of the claim is still necessary.203
The Census baseline must be examined because “it may be the case
that the census count itself makes choices inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause.”204 Put another way, the Census might include a
group not similarly situated in any relevant respect.205 This inquiry
seeks to determine whether a category of “residents” have a very
different relationship to the local democratic process and their
assigned representative than other residents in the district to apply
the “representational nexus” criteria to the established one-person
one-vote framework.206
Ultimately, the court held that Jefferson County’s inclusion of
prisoners in its redistricting population base diluted the
representational strength of individuals in other districts, and violated
the Equal Protection Clause.207 The Calvin court reached this
conclusion because the prisoners “comprise a (1) large number of
(2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational nexus with
the [County] Boards, and . . . [are] (4) packed into a small subset of
legislative districts.”208 Calvin could be seen as a special case because
the incarcerated population was so large relative to the small district
that it created a population deviation of 42.63% among districts.209
Critics also might claim that this case could create a slippery slope,
forcing courts to contemplate which individuals are “worthy” of being
considered part of a locality’s population data in an increasing
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1315.
See id. at 1313.
Id. (alterations in original).
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1313–14.
See id.
Id. at 1315.
Id. (alterations in original).
See id. at 1323.
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number of contexts, for example: should an apportionment base
include minors, non-citizens, or citizens disenfranchised due to a
conviction.210 This case does not, however, raise the specter of a
slippery slope because prisoners are different than other non-voting
groups211 and the court reviewed the facts specific to state prisoners,
their nexus to representatives in local government, and substantial
population disparities created by counting prisoners as residents.212
But even if Calvin presents a relatively extreme set of facts, the
same principles apply to most prison contexts. The factors that lead
courts to exclude other groups from the apportionment base are all
present in incarcerated populations.213 A case decided by the
Supreme Court two weeks after the district court’s decision in Calvin
would not necessitate a different result.
B. Does Evenwel v. Abbott Change the Analysis of Whether
Persons Incarcerated Are Residents of Their Prison Cell or Home
Address?
Between the District Court’s decision in Calvin and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision in a similar case later that
same year, the Supreme Court decided Evenwel v. Abbott,214 which
did not raise prison districting questions, but addressed the
appropriate base for state legislative apportionment.215 Although this
case does not involve prison gerrymandering, it addresses some of the
principles at issue in prison gerrymandering cases.
In Evenwel, the plaintiffs, Texas voters, argued that only the voteeligible population should be included in the apportionment base for
redistricting.216
They claimed that one-person, one-vote
constitutional principles prohibited Texas from drawing its legislative
district lines on the basis of total population because doing so would
violate “voter equality.”217 Instead, plaintiffs argued that the State
should use eligible voters as the applicable population base, removing

210. See id. at 1324 (referencing defendants’ “slippery slope” argument regarding
apportionment).
211. See supra Section II.C.
212. See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1324.
213. See id. at 1325.
214. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
215. See id. at 1123.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 1126.
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others—including non-citizens and minors—from the districting
count.218
The State of Texas took the slightly different position that its “use
of total-population data from the census was permissible,” but that
the Constitution also allows for it to use Census survey estimates of
the citizen voting age population (“CVAP”)219 as the redistricting
base.220 The United States filed a statement of interest that agreed
with Texas that the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate the
use of the voter-eligible population for apportionment, and urged the
Court not to address the question of whether the Constitution allows
States to use the voter-eligible population as an alternative
population base for redistricting.221
The Court held that Texas’s practice of drawing its legislative
districts based on total population, rather than the voter-eligible
population, satisfied one-person, one-vote principles and was
therefore permissible.222
The decision recognized principles
consistent with representational equality.223 As the Supreme Court
explained in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,224 the principle that there ought
to be equal representation for equal numbers of people is designed to
prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to

218. See id.
219. This is administered using the American Community Survey (“ACS”). For
more information, see American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ [https://perma.cc/4CGB-NGKR].
220. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1126.
221. See id. The United States has authority to file a Statement of Interest
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which permits the Attorney General to attend to the
interests of the United States in any case pending in a federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 517 (2012).
222. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132–33.
223. See Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at
*4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
224. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
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elected representatives.225 Evenwel maintained the import of the
principles in Kirkpatrick.226
C.

Davidson v. City of Cranston

While the district court in Calvin relied on the concept of
representational equality, in a similar case, Davidson v. City of
Cranston,227 the First Circuit rejected a district court’s decision that
was similar in its reasoning to Calvin and instead held that including
non-voting prisoners in an electoral apportionment base was
consistent with one-person, one-vote requirements.228
Davidson involved a challenge to a redistricting plan that included
3433 incarcerated people of the Adult Correctional Institution
(“ACI”) in the population count for a local city ward in the City of
Cranston, Rhode Island.229 With this allocation, a full twenty-five
percent of the ward population was incarcerated and could not
vote.230 The district court denied the city’s motion to dismiss the
lawsuit, finding that its redistricting plan—in which the ACI
population was counted within one of the city’s six wards—was not
justified by principles of electoral equality since the people
incarcerated at ACI “do[ ] not participate in any aspect of the City’s
civic life.”231 The district court held that “the inclusion of the ACI
prison population is not advancing the principle of electoral equality
because the majority of prisoners, pursuant to the State’s
Constitution, cannot vote, and those who can . . . vote by absentee
ballot from their pre-incarceration address.”232

225. See id. at 531 (recognizing in a congressional districting case that “[e]qual
representation for equal numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent
debasement of voting power”). The Court held that Missouri’s redistricting plan did
not satisfy the “as nearly as practicable” standard because the 25,000-plus population
difference between the largest and smallest districts was avoidable. Id. It explained
that “equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve
absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.” Id. Prisoners’ non-voting
status and inability to engage and participate in civic life in other ways; the
differences in the prison population and the surrounding population; and the severely
separate cultures, at the very least provide justification. See id. at 536.
226. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1131.
227. 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
228. See id. at 137.
229. See id.
230. See Davidson v. City of Cranston, 42 F. Supp. 3d 325, 331 (D.R.I. 2014).
231. Id. at 332.
232. Id. at 331 (alterations in original).
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The First Circuit reversed the district court and determined that
the City of Cranston was not required to exclude people in prison
from the apportionment process and that the Constitution does not
give the federal courts the power to interfere with Cranston’s decision
to include them.233 The First Circuit interpreted Evenwel to stand for
three propositions. First, in its view, Evenwel “did not disturb
Supreme Court precedent that apportionment claims involving only
minor deviations normally require a showing of invidious
discrimination.”234
So long as equal population distribution
requirements are met, the First Circuit held that a plaintiff must show
intentional discrimination to make out an Equal Protection claim.235
Second, absent a showing of intentional discrimination, the First
Circuit held that “Evenwel reinforces the principle that federal courts
must give deference to decisions by local election authorities related
to apportionment.”236 Third, the First Circuit determined that
Evenwel “approved the status quo of using total population from the
Census for apportionment.”237
D. Reconciling Calvin, Evenwel, and Davidson to Create a
Functional Framework for Apportioning Incarcerated Persons
The federal courts that have addressed the issue of prison
districting did not resolve the question of whether, for apportionment
purposes, prisoners should be counted in the place where they lived
prior to incarceration or in the place where they were involuntarily
confined at the time of the Census. The Evenwel decision likewise
does not answer this question, only a far more general question of
whether a state’s use of total population is a permissible
apportionment base for drawing state legislative districts.238
Permitting the use of total population in Evenwel is not
inconsistent with challenging prison districting in the Calvin case and
the Davidson case.239 The Court in Evenwel, although it did not
233. See Davidson, 837 F.3d at 144.
234. Id. at 141.
235. See id. at 142 (discussing the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
560–61 (1964), as articulated in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966), that were
left undisturbed by the Court in Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016)).
236. Davidson, 837 F.3d at 141; see also id. at 143 (“[C]ourts should give wide
latitude to political decisions related to apportionment that work no invidious
discrimination.”).
237. See id. at 143.
238. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).
239. See Sean Young, “Home” Is Not Where You Are Involuntarily Confined,
ACLU (Oct. 15, 2015, 5:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/voting-rights/
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address prison gerrymandering, articulated general apportionment
goals and principles that can be read to support counting prisoners in
their home districts in most instances.240 Evenwel maintained the
equal population rule that “[s]tates must draw congressional districts
with populations as close to perfect equality as possible,”241 but its
reasoning in support of population equality does not undermine
claims of unlawful dilution due to prison gerrymandering.242
While the Court in Evenwel rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the
Constitution requires states to exclude ineligible voters from their
population counts, it did not specifically address the appropriate place
to count any particular group of non-voting persons.243 Where then
should prisoners be counted for apportionment purposes: the place
where they lived prior to incarceration, or the place where they were
involuntarily confined at the time of the Census?
In many ways, the principles articulated in Evenwel could support
the exclusion of prison populations from the districts in which they
are incarcerated.
The Court’s support for total population as a permissive
apportionment base does not conflict with the representational and
electoral equality principles, as articulated in Calvin, in the prison
gerrymandering context. In Evenwel, the Court highlighted states’
“interest in taking reasonable, nondiscriminatory steps to facilitate
access [to representatives] for all its residents” in response to Texas’s
argument that constituents (presumably the non-voting variety) “have
gerrymandering/home-not-where-you-are-involuntarily-confined?redirect=blog/
speak-freely/home-not-where-you-are-involuntarily-confined [https://perma.cc/C7P588F3]. The article clarifies:
The ACLU believes that for the 2.4 million individuals now incarcerated in
this country, their “home” should be counted as being the place where they
lived prior to incarceration. Counting these incarcerated individuals as
“residents” of the district where they have been involuntarily confined
artificially inflates the population of the districts in which the prison is
based. This type of prison-based gerrymandering results in an unequal
system of representation where, after prisoner bodies are siphoned into the
district where the prison is based, their numbers are used to increase the
district’s political power at the expense of the communities from which
these incarcerated individuals had lived.

Id.

240. See generally Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1123.
241. Id. at 1124 (alterations in original) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
530–31 (1969)).
242. See id. at 1131; see also Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531 (recognizing in a
congressional districting case that “[e]qual representation for equal numbers of
people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminution
of access to elected representatives”).
243. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132–33.
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no constitutional right to equal access to their elected
representatives.”244 The Court explained that non-voters have an
“important stake in many policy debates . . . and in receiving
constituent services, such as help navigating public-benefits
bureaucracies.”245
It concluded that “by ensuring that each
representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same
number of constituents, total-population apportionment promotes
equitable and effective representation.”246
This reasoning does not necessarily support an apportionment base
that includes prisoners, who are distinct from other non-voting groups
in three ways. First, they are subject to a different system of services
from those living around them because they are dependent on the
company imprisoning them for all of their needs. With few
exceptions, they are prohibited from accessing external public
benefits.247 Second, prisoners do not become eligible voters again
until after they complete their sentence and re-locate, so unlike
minors or non-citizens, they cannot become a voter over the course of
their “residence” (for prisoners, their incarceration) in the district.
Indeed, even if they later become vote-eligible constituents, their
voting rights are revived only upon relocation to their postincarceration home community. Third, in other contexts, members of
the same family or community, who often share interests, can
advocate for the non-voters in their community, including their
children or other family members and neighbors, with whom they
have close ties. Prisoners cannot form community ties with the
community surrounding the prison because they are, by design, kept
isolated.
Moreover, even though the Evenwel Court declined to mandate
using the vote-eligible population as a redistricting base, the Court
left the door open to other approaches. It recognized that many
states adjust total population data according to states’ other
constitutional or statutory requirements.248 Evenwel noted that ten
states authorize the removal of certain groups from the totalpopulation apportionment base; three states exclude certain nonpermanent residents, including nonresident members of the

244. Id. at 1132 n.14 (alterations in original).
245. Id. at 1132 (alterations in original).
246. Id.
247. See Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1322
(2016).
248. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct at 1124.
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military.249 The Court specifically recognized that four states—
California, Delaware, Maryland, and New York—adjust total
population data to exclude incarcerated persons who were domiciled
out-of-state prior to incarceration.250 And the Evenwel decision
seemingly left in place the expectation that adjustments must be
systematic, an undertaking that presents less of a problem for group
residencies like prisons than it would for, say, students,251 since
apportionment base adjustments for prisoners became readily
administrable with the 2010 Census.252 In all, the principles behind a
representational nexus and representational equality, described in
Calvin, gain support in Evenwel. Those principles cannot be served
unless prisoners are appropriately assigned to their home district.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK AND MARYLAND SINCE 2010
Despite challenges to the more pronounced instances of prison
gerrymandering like Calvin and Davidson, litigation alone cannot
solve all the permutations of representational inequity. Litigating in
each of the 5393 Census blocks that contain prisons would be
impossible.253 A combination of litigation and legislative campaigns
are necessary to mitigate the problem of representational inequality
due to prison gerrymandering. Improvements in New York and
Maryland since the last decennial Census provide some examples.

249. See id. at 1124 n.3.
250. See id. The Court noted: “Adopting voter-eligible apportionment as
constitutional command would upset a well-functioning approach to districting that
all 50 States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for decades, even
centuries.” Id. at 1132. That the Court recognized this fact immediately after noting
that some states count prisoners differently, suggests that the Court considers voter
eligibility not to be the only factor to consider in assessing the constitutionality of
prison gerrymandering. Even the Davidson court recognized that an adjustment of
total population data to exclude prisoners with out-of-state domiciles could be
permitted, despite its determination that there is no “constitutional requirement even
for in-state prisoners.” Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir.
2016).
251. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct at 1131–32.
252. Revisiting the discussion of student populations in Cleveland, students may
share a non-resident status, but with some living in dorms (which the Census would
capture as a group residence) and some off-campus, they are inter-mingled with the
rest of the town’s population, whereas prisoners are easy to exclude as a group using
the Census group residence data. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.
253. See Letter from Michael W. Macleod-Ball & Ruthie Epstein, ACLU, to
Karen Humes, Chief, U.S. Census Bureau, at 2 (July 20, 2015) [hereinafter ACLU
Comment on 2020 Census Residence Rule], http://riaclu.org/images/uploads/ACLU_
Comments-_Census_Residence_Rule_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5LJ-2KM4].
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Part IV examines statutory changes and state court challenges since
2010 that improved methods for determining prisoners’ homes.
Section IV.A describes legislation and state court litigation resulting
in changes to the apportionment of prisoners in New York. Section
IV.B reviews state legislation and federal litigation to count prisoners
at their home addresses in Maryland.
A. New York: Little v. LATFOR
Until 2010, New York counted prisoners as residents of the
location in which they were incarcerated, not in their home districts
where they are likely to return after serving their sentence.254 In
2012, following the 2010 decennial Census, the New York State
legislature passed section 71(8) of the New York Corrections Law,
requiring the state to count prisoners in their home communities for
the purposes of state redistricting.255 The statute put the onus on the
Department of Corrections to report each prisoner’s residential
address prior to incarceration to the state legislative task force on
demographic research and reapportionment.256 The independent
redistricting commission would then allocate the imprisoned
population accordingly.257
The legislation was a long time coming. In years prior, when New
York State counted prisoners as residents of the prison in which they
were incarcerated, the misallocation severely skewed the state
legislative districting lines throughout the state. For example, seven
of New York’s sixty-three state senators only met the safe-harbor
population requirement because the state considered incarcerated
persons residents of the prison district.258 Had prisoners been
counted in their home district, the population in those seven districts
containing prisons would have been underpopulated (deviated more
than ten percent from the population of other districts).259 This is a

254. See id.
255. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 71(8) (McKinney 2017); ACLU Comment on 2020
Census Residence Rule, supra note 253, at 2.
256. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 71(8)(a)(iii) (McKinney 2017).
257. See N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 94(1) (McKinney 2017).
258. See ACLU Comment on 2020 Census Residence Rule, supra note 253, at 2
(citing Wagner, Breaking the Census, supra note 96, at 1243, 1241–60); see also New
York’s Census Adjustment Act, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (June 16, 2010),
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/factsheets/ny/NY_census_adjustment_act.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BJ4-FEJT].
259. See PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS:
PRISONERS
AND
POLITICAL
CLOUT
IN
NEW
YORK
(2002),
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result of the state imprisoning individuals far from their home
communities. Although forty-five percent of all people in New York
State prisons came from New York City, only four of the state’s fiftyfive prisons are located in New York City.260 The remainder of state
prisons are located in upstate, rural, predominantly white
communities: “approximately seventy-five percent of New York’s
prisons are located more than one hundred miles from New York
City, more than sixty percent are located over two hundred miles
from the city, and over a third are located more than three hundred
miles from the city.”261
Given racial disparities in incarceration, imprisoning individuals far
from their home communities produces a large, racially
disproportionate effect.
“The incarceration rate for African
Americans in New York is nine and a half times that of whites; for
Latinos it is four and a half times that of whites.”262 These disparities
result in an incarcerated population in New York that is around
seventy-three percent African-American or Latino.263 At the same
time, “virtually all—[ninety-eight percent]—of New York state’s
prison cells were located in state senate districts that are
disproportionately White, diluting the votes of African-American and
Latino voters.”264
Counting prisoners as residents of their prison district strengthens
the vote of non-incarcerated residents of the prison district, even
though those residents lack any engagement with the prison
population and may have interests diametrically opposed to those of
the prisoners. At the same time, this practice dilutes the vote of
prisoners’ home communities, despite even a short stay in prison,265
during which they are disenfranchised.266 This is particularly stark in
New York: nearly a quarter of those incarcerated come from only
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/importing.html [https://perma.cc/HX2MJSL8].
260. Erika L. Wood, One Significant Step: How Reforms to Prison Districts Begin
to Address Political Inequality, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 179, 187–88 (2015).
261. See id. at 188 (alterations in original).
262. Id.
263. See id. (“Seventy-three percent of those currently incarcerated in New York
are African American and Latino.”).
264. Wagner, Breaking the Census, supra note 96, at 1241, 1244.
265. See Wood, supra note 260, at 188 (“The average length of time served in New
York prisons is 3.5 years.”).
266. See S. 6610C, 231st Leg. Sess., A. 9710D, 234th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010)
(demonstrating this gap through an explanation of the process by which the
legislative task force determines the incarcerated person’s residential address prior to
incarceration for redistricting purposes).
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seven out of sixty-three state senate districts representing minority
communities in New York City.267
Following the passage of Part XX, the legislative precursor to
section 71(8) of the New York Corrections Law, Republican State
Senator Elizabeth Little of the 45th District—which contains 12,000
incarcerated persons—and others challenged the constitutionality of
the new law in Little v. Legislative Task Force on Demographic
Research and Reapportionment (“LATFOR”).268 Plaintiffs argued
that the new law violated the New York constitutional requirement
that “the federal census taken in the year nineteen hundred thirty and
each federal census taken decennially thereafter shall be controlling
as to the number of inhabitants in the state or any part thereof for the
purposes of the apportionment.”269 The New York Civil Liberties
Union, along with fourteen other organizations and individuals,
intervened for defendants, arguing that treating them or their
members as residents of a prison “artificially inflates the voting
strength of those who live in districts where prisons are located, and
dilutes the voting strength of every New Yorker who lives in a district
that does not house a state prison.”270
On December 1, 2011, a New York state trial court upheld the law
as constitutional.271 The court noted that while the Census Bureau
found it would be highly difficult to collect residential data for every
incarcerated person, it agreed that states were free to decide what
constituted an incarcerated person’s “usual residence” for
redistricting purposes, whether it is the prison location, their preincarceration address, or another formula altogether.272 The court
recognized the Census Bureau’s 2010 early release of “group
quarters” data to allow states to count incarcerated persons at their
home locations, if they choose to.273 With regard to the one-person,
one-vote question, the court determined that counting prisoners at
their home address was permissible and distinct from treatment of

267. See Wood, supra note 260, at 187–88.
268. See Complaint at 1, Little v. N.Y. Legislative Task Force on Demographic
Research & Reapportionment (Little v. LATFOR), No. 2310-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 4, 2011).
269. See N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4.
270. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 5, Little v. LATFOR, No.
2310-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 17, 2011).
271. Decision and Order at 9, Little v. LAFTOR, No. 2310-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/little/Decision_and_Order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BG9-NV7L].
272. Id. at 6.
273. Id. at 6–7.
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both college students and military personnel because prisoners’ stays
within their prison districts lack permanency.274 Most significantly,
the court recognized prisoners’ lack of ties to, and the separation of
their interests from, the community surrounding the prison: for
instance, incarcerated persons do not attend local schools or use other
public facilities.275 The court notes that the sponsor of the challenged
legislation “sought to rectify ‘electoral inequalities’” that were
created by counting incarcerated individuals as part of the districts in
which they are temporarily and involuntarily held.276 Like Calvin, the
LATFOR decision was a decisive victory for both electoral and
representational equality.
On February 14, 2012, the New York Court of Appeals declined to
hear an appeal.277 And on March 13, 2012, the plaintiffs withdrew
their appeal.278 The 2012 cycle of redistricting proceeded under the
new law.
B.

Maryland: Fletcher v. Lamone

Another example of courts’ willingness to rectify the vote dilution
from miscounting people in prisons occurred in Fletcher v.
Lamone.279 The case addressed a 2010 Maryland law, the No
Representation Without Population Act, which was enacted to
“correct census data for the distortional effects of the Census
Bureau’s practice of counting prison inmates as residents of their
place of incarceration.”280
The No Representation Without
Population Act removed incarcerated citizens from the population
count of where they were incarcerated and instead reassigned them to
their home address.281

274. See id. at 7 (“Though inmates may be physically found in the locations of their
respective correctional facilities at the time the Census is conducted, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that such inmates have any actual permanency in these
locations or have an intent to remain. In fact, it is undisputed that inmates are
transferred among the states correctional facilities at the discretion of DOCCS and
plaintiffs have not proffered evidence that inmates have substantial ties to the
communities in which they are involuntarily and temporarily located.”).
275. See id. at 8.
276. Id.
277. Little v. LATFOR, 18 N.Y.3d 902, 902 (N.Y. 2012).
278. Letter to Court, Little v. LAFTOR, No. 2301-2011 (Mar. 13, 2012),
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/little/LATFORletter-dropAppeal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TNW-KLY4].
279. 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 567 U.S. 930 (2012).
280. Id. at 890.
281. See id. at 893; see also Wood, supra note 260, at 180.
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The distortional effects of Maryland’s prior method of
apportionment stemmed from the fact that the majority of Maryland’s
state prisoners come from areas with a majority Black population,
and the state’s prisons are located primarily in the majority white
districts.282 Specifically, the incarcerated population in Maryland
comes largely from the state capital, Baltimore, an urban hub.283
After the 2000 Census, however, the state’s largest prisons were (and
are still) “located in the overwhelmingly White First and Sixth
districts on the Eastern Shore and in Western Maryland,
respectively.”284 For example, District 6 contained 6754 incarcerated
people.285 Both of these districts are in rural parts of the state. If
those prisoners were properly “credited” to their home districts, the
two majority African American districts, Districts 4 and 7, would
receive 1629 and 4832 people, respectively.286
The distortive effect of counting people where they are
incarcerated results in particularly perverse outcomes in Maryland.
The court raised one such example: District 1 of the Somerset County
Council was created in the 1980s as a majority-minority district in
order to settle a Voting Rights Act lawsuit.287 Soon after it was
created, “because the largely minority population of Eastern
Correctional Institute was counted in the district’s population for
redistricting purposes, only a small number of African Americans
who ‘reside’ in the district were actually eligible to vote. As a result,
an African-American was not elected to fill the seat until 2010.”288
As a result of Maryland counting people where they are
incarcerated, residents of districts with prisons were systematically
“overrepresented” compared to other districts.289 To rectify the
imbalance, the No Representation Without Population Act required
that for local, state, and federal redistricting, “inmates of state or
federal prisons located in Maryland must be counted as residents of

282. See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
283. Brief of Howard University School of Law Civil Rights Clinic et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendants at 7, Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 [hereinafter Brief
of Howard Law Civil Rights Clinic et al.], https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/
fletcher/Final_Fletcher_amicus_with_affidavit_and_service.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6KD8-WTKF].
284. Id. at 14.
285. Id. at 28 n.42.
286. See id. at 11.
287. See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 893 n.2.
288. Id.
289. See id.
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their last known residence before incarceration.”290 Moreover,
“[p]risoners who were not Maryland residents prior to incarceration
are excluded from the population count, and prisoners whose last
known address cannot be determined are counted as residents of the
district where their facility is located.”291 The subsequent lawsuit
sought to maintain the pre-2010 power imbalance.292 Not one of the
plaintiffs lived in District 4 or 7, the majority-minority districts that
would be “credited” the most residents and whose residents would
regain the equal strength of their voting rights.293
The court granted summary judgment to defendants and upheld
the Act as constitutional.294 Like LATFOR, Fletcher provides an
example of a state legislative initiative to address inequity, which was
approved by a court. Following the decision in Fletcher, Maryland
has created more equitable districts by counting prisoners as members
of their home community.295 At the same time, Maryland has also
liberalized its felony disenfranchisement laws. Effective March 10,
2016, citizens convicted of a felony who completed their prison term
automatically had their right to vote restored and immediately
became eligible to register and vote upon release.296 The new law
immediately restored voting rights to approximately 40,000 people.297
Together, these two remedial measures in Maryland began to restore
democracy.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
See id. at 890.
See Brief of Howard Law Civil Rights Clinic et al., supra note 283, at 8.
See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
See generally PETER WAGNER & OLIVIA CUMMINGS, PRISON POLICY

INITIATIVE, IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS: INCARCERATED PEOPLE AND POLITICAL
CLOUT IN MARYLAND (2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/md/report.html
[https://perma.cc/7HNR-3PEY].
296. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102 (West 2016).
297. Voting Rights Restoration in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restorationefforts-maryland [https://perma.cc/GB5N-3YZ3]. Before the law was passed, from
2007 to 2016, returning citizens did not become eligible to vote until they completed
all aspects of their sentence, including parole, probation, and payment of fines and
fees. Id.
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V. USING REPRESENTATIONAL EQUALITY FRAMEWORK:
PRISONERS’ “USUAL RESIDENCE” SHOULD BE THEIR HOME, NOT
THEIR CELL, AND REDISTRICTING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN
ACCORDINGLY
If there ever were “severable communities of interest” with unique
political and socio-economic identities,298 it is prisoners and the
community that surrounds a prison. When the interests of people in
prisons are diametrically opposed to others within their district,
including those who are in the business of imprisoning them (for
example, corrections, healthcare, or catering contractors of the
prison), local elected representatives have little incentive to serve the
interests of their temporary, non-voting, incarcerated constituents.
Section V.A explains why prisons are substantively different from
other “group quartered” residents and why people in prison should,
as a default rule, be considered residents of the home they inhabited
prior to their incarceration or intend to return to, not their prison cell.
Sections V.B and V.C explain why the data collected and produced by
the Census Bureau are administratively expedient, but not
determinative of the appropriate base population for redistricting.
Section V.D looks forward to the 2020 Census and describes, briefly,
options for states to ‘move’ their prisoner population back to the
prisoners’ pre-incarceration addresses for purposes of redistricting.
A. Prisoners Are Different
Federal courts have, in many instances, recognized characteristics
of students and military base residents that resonate for prisoners,
such as ties to a prior residence from which they came and to which
they likely intend to return.299 Put simply, treating students, military
base residents, and prisoners differently than other residents makes
sense. But even the assumption that college students, military base
residents, and prisoners are similarly situated to each other is
298. Kostik v. Nago, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1132 (D. Haw. 2012).
299. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 95 (1996); Fairley v. Patterson, 493
F.2d 598, 602–03 (5th Cir. 1974); Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; Boddie v.
Cleveland Sch. Dist., NO. 4:07CV63-M-B, 2010 WL 231749, at *3 (D. Miss. Jan. 14,
2010); discussion supra Sections II.B.2, II.B.3; see also Borough of Bethel Park v.
Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that there is a rational basis for
counting inmates as residents of their prison because they “usually stay for long
periods of time”). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit presumed in Borough
of Bethel Park that “[p]eople in this category [prisoners] as distinguished from, for
example, those temporarily in a hospital for a short duration, often have no other
fixed place of abode, and the length of their institutional stay is often indefinite.” Id.
Even if this presumption was accurate at the time, it no longer is accurate today.
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“questionable at best.”300 Both students and military base residents
have a more “substantial connection to, and effect on, the
communities where they reside than do prisoners.”301 Indeed, one of
the purposes of incarceration is to isolate prisoners from surrounding
populations.
Prisoners have no choice but to “reside” at their prison location,
distinguishing them from, for instance, students who may choose
where to eat, sleep, and work, as referenced by the Third Circuit in
Borough of Bethel Park.302 Prisoners are prohibited from deciding
where they are held and can be transferred at the discretion of
corrections officials.303 Often they are held far from their home
communities, despite the strain this places on maintaining familial
relationships.304
More significantly, prisoners cannot vote.305 Both students and
military service members and their dependents not only have a choice
in where they live, but, depending on what they consider their
permanent home, they choose where they vote, whereas prisoners
convicted of a felony in all but two states do not have the right at
all.306 Treating non-voting prisoners as residents of their true home
district, therefore, serves the representational equality principles
discussed in Calvin and Fletcher.307 Prisoners’ status as distinct,
insular, and non-voting constituents is significant in three ways.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011).

Id.
See Borough of Bethel Park, 449 F.2d at 579.
See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
See Johnna Christian, Riding the Bus: Barriers to Prison Visitation and
Family Management Strategies, 21 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUST. 31, 34–35 (2005)

(noting that, in the case of New York City, while there “is a small cluster of facilities
relatively close,” some of the other facilities are over 100 miles away, some taking
over a 6.5 hour drive to get to).
305. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76
(1974).
306. For military service members, see Voting Residency Guidelines: Members of
the Uniformed Services and Their Eligible Family Members, FED. VOTING
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://www.fvap.gov/info/laws/voting-residency-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/SUN2-UKUM]. For students, see Richard Niemi et al., Where Can
College Students Vote? A Legal and Empirical Perspective, 8 ELECTION L.J. 327,
335–36 (2009) (noting that while there are permissible evidentiary requirements
states can enact for students to vote in their jurisdictions, generally, students can
choose where to register to vote).
307. See Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1307
(D. Fla. 2016); Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011); see also
discussion supra Section III.D.
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First, prisoners are non-voting constituents without a
representational nexus to local representatives, whereas military
personnel and students have a stronger nexus, particularly if they vote
locally, or have the option to vote locally by self-defining their
permanent home. In Fletcher, the Court found the “assumption” that
“college students, soldiers, and prisoners are all similarly situated
groups” to be “questionable at best,”308 specifically because “college
students and members of the military are eligible to vote, while
incarcerated persons are not.”309 In that sense, districts containing
non-voting prisoners create more robust representation for the
residents of the district who are not incarcerated. This takes
representational weight away from the residents of districts from
which the prisoners came and to which they are likely to return.
Second, because of the disparities in the criminal justice system, the
people incarcerated often hail from communities extremely different
from the prison towns in which they are incarcerated.310 The interests
of the imprisoned population and the population of towns
surrounding prisons diverge substantially.311 Prisons are often placed
in disproportionately white, more rural districts than prisoners’ home
districts.312 Between skewed criminal justice enforcement and the
skewed incentives to build prisons to stimulate local economies, there
is often a vast divide between incarcerated people and the residents
surrounding a prison.
Third, not only do people in prison lose their right to vote, they
also lose the ability to participate in outside community life. Prisons

308. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
309. Id.
310. See discussion supra Part I.
311. See Ho, supra note 6, at 371.
312. In the state of New York, all new prisons constructed since 1982 have been
built upstate, in predominantly white districts represented by a Republican in the
state legislator. See WAGNER, supra note 259. Until New York became one of the
few states to count the prison population at their home address, seven districts would
have been under-populated and fifteen down-state districts are right up against the
allowable deviation from population equality. See S. 6610C, 231st Leg. Sess., A.
9710D, 234th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010). This means the entire district map changed
when the change in law required the use of a non-prison base population. In
Maryland, a disproportionate percentage of the state’s imprisoned population comes
from Baltimore. See Brief of Howard Law Civil Rights Clinic et al., supra note 283, at
14 (“The state’s largest prisons are located in the overwhelmingly White First and
Sixth districts on the Eastern Shore and in Western Maryland, respectively. Given
that incarcerated persons in these prisons are not permitted to vote, the only result of
including their population numbers as part of the prison districts is to use this
population to increase the representation of the overwhelmingly White First and
Sixth districts.”).
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allow for only a limited connection between people incarcerated and
the residents of the community surrounding the prison and few
opportunities to politically engage. By contrast, college students and
military personnel can choose to engage their surrounding
communities in civic life. In this sense, “both groups have a much
more substantial connection to, and effect on, the communities where
they reside than do prisoners.”313 According to the factors federal
courts have considered as relevant to cases challenging how college
students, military base residents, and overseas federal employees are
counted,314 prisoners should, by default, be counted in their home
community to serve principles of representative equality.
B.

The Census Bureau’s Continued Use of the “Usual Residence”
Rule Is Not Determinative

As explained above, the “usual residence” rule does not reflect the
living situation of the nation’s more than two million prisoners, nor
does it take into account the significant growth of the prison
population over the past thirty years and its distortive effect on
democracy. By calling prison cells residences, “the Census Bureau
concentrated a normally city-based population that is
disproportionately male and African-American or Latino into just
5393 Census blocks that are located far from their actual homes and
often in rural areas.”315 In fact, to determine a person’s legal
residence outside of the apportionment context, “most states have
explicit constitutional provisions or statutes that declare that a prison
cell is not a residence.”316 Moreover, the Census Bureau’s use of
“usual residence” is at odds with other governmental uses of the term,

313. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
314. See discussion supra Sections II.C.1–3.
315. See ACLU Comment on 2020 Census Residence Rule, supra note 253.
316. Wagner, Breaking the Census, supra note 96, at 1241–60, 1252 n.67 (“In most
states, constitutions and statutes go even further, explicitly declaring that
incarceration does not change a person’s legal residence. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art.
VII, § 3; Colo. Const. art. VII, § 4; Minn. Const. art. VII, § 2; Mo. Const. art. VIII, §
6; Nev. Const. art. II, § 2; N.Y. Const. art. II, § 4; Or. Const. art. II, § 4; Wash. Const.
art. VI, § 4; Alaska Stat. § 15.05.020(1) (2011); Cal. Elec. Code § 2025 (2011); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 9-14 (2011); D.C. Code § 1-1001.02(2) (D) (2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1113(5) (2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 34-405 (2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 112(7)
(2011); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.11 (2011); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-1-63 (2011); Mont.
Code Ann. § 13-1-112(2) (2011); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §654:2-a (2011); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 1-1-7(D) (2011); Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1302(a)(3) (2011); R.I. Gen Laws § 17-1-3.1
(2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-122(7) (2011); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 1.015(e) (2011);
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-101(2)(a), - 105(4)(c) (iii) (2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17,
§ 2122 (2011).”).
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which, for example, do not consider a person’s location in prison as
sufficient for diversity jurisdiction in federal courts or sufficient to
allow their children to attend a local public school.317 Redistricting
should follow the trend of counting incarcerated people at a home
location.
The Census Bureau data are just that: data. Even if the Census
does not directly calculate adjustments for people in prison, the data
it provides enables states to do so.318 The Bureau counts people
where they are incarcerated for pragmatic and administrative reasons,
not legal ones.319 “The Bureau has explained that counting prisoners
at their home addresses would require ‘collecting information from
each prisoner individually’ and necessitate ‘an extensive coordination
procedure’” with correctional facilities, which would cost upward of
$250 million.320 For the 2010 Census, the Bureau made the tools
available for states to make those adjustments by releasing its
population data for “group quarters” early to enable states to “leave
the prisoners counted where the prisons are, delete them from
redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other locale.”321 States
should use the available data to reconsider their treatment of people
in prison in the redistricting process.
CONCLUSION
In forty-four states, prisoners are treated as residents of their
prison cell for the purposes of creating electoral districts, although
they themselves cannot vote, and are likely to return to their home
community after serving their term of incarceration.322 Those sent to
prison are disproportionately people of color and disproportionately
come from urban areas.323 Prisons, however, are increasingly located
in more rural areas, among disproportionately white, more
conservative populations.324 Given the potential incongruity between
non-voting prisoners’ political interests and the political interests of
residents of the districts where prisons are located, peoples’ homes
317. Prison Policy Initiative, Comment Letter on the Census Bureau’s Proposed
2020 Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 81 Fed. Reg. 42577 (June 30,
2016),
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/letters/2016/PPI_Demos_2016_FRN_
comment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PVR-BJ52].
318. See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
319. See id.
320. Id. at 895–86 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 157, at 10).
321. Id. at 896 (citing Groves, supra note 156).
322. See supra Introduction; see also supra Part V.
323. See supra Section I.A.
324. See supra Section I.B.2.
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prior to their incarceration, not their prison cells, should be treated as
their usual residence to serve constitutional principles underlying the
one-person, one-vote requirements.325
Designating peoples’ pre-incarceration home as their usual
residence is consistent with the factors considered in courts’ treatment
of residents of other group quarters, including college students,
residents of military bases, and overseas federal employees.326 Due to
prisoners’ severe isolation from, and lack of ties to, surrounding
communities, the finite term of their incarceration, their lack of
agency in deciding the location of their incarceration, and
importantly, their status as non-voters in forty-eight states, their home
prior to incarceration would be more appropriately designated as
their usual residence than a prison cell.327
A district’s residents who are able to vote for, access, and hold
accountable local representatives often have interests divergent from
their incarcerated neighbors, correlating, in part, to the urban-rural
and racial differences in those two populations.328 Legislators in
districts containing a prison have no representational nexus to their
incarcerated constituents who cannot vote, take their concerns to
their representatives, or seek redress for the issues that affect their
daily lives.329 The court’s decision in Calvin, finding that local district
lines violated one-person, one-vote constitutional requirements is
consistent with principles of representational equality, electoral
equality, and the requirements of the Evenwel decision recently
announced by the Supreme Court.330
Counting incarcerated people as residents of their cells overweights the voting strength of a prison district’s non-incarcerated
residents and dilutes the voting strength of the residents of
surrounding districts.331 As we look toward the 2020 decennial
Census and subsequent redistricting, states and localities have an
opportunity to promote representational equality by “moving” the
prison population for purposes of apportionment back to a home
address. Doing so serves the principles of representational and
electoral equality underlying the one-person, one-vote standard, and
the values of a fair and representative democracy.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Sections III.A, V.A.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section I.B.2.

